Higher Education Reforms in India

The number of institutions and enrollment in higher education continue their rapid growth, but the quality of this education remains uncertain. A small number of state-subsidized institutions attract a thin top layer of talent from each year's cohort. High selectivity of admission to these elite institutions provides a screen valued by potential employers. Domestic and foreign demand for the services of these few thousand students has created an inflated reputation of the overall quality of India's higher education. The number of such graduates remains small relative to the population and the demands of India's economy for educated manpower. Reliable estimates of value-added by higher education, beyond the screening value of admission to elite institutions, are needed to assess colleges and universities, and to guide educational policy.

Graduate education - the seed farm of higher education and scholarship - continues in an alarming state of disarray with respect to both quality and quantity. Pressed by budgetary constraints, the government appears to have decided on profit-oriented privatization of higher education as the solution. Political and business classes, with significant overlap between the two, see higher education as a source of lucrative private returns on investment. There is little theoretical or empirical evidence that supports the prospects of success of a for-profit model in building quality higher education. Some recent proposals hold promise of radical reform and renovation, including regulatory restructuring. It remains unclear whether the government has the wisdom, determination, financing, and power to push reforms past the resistance from entrenched faculty and from the political and business classes.

This is an abstract of a longer paper available for download: Sunder, Shyam, Higher Education Reforms in India (June 28, 2010). Yale SOM Working Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1652277

Exploiting Customer Errors

I attended a Yale School of Management research workshop by a visiting professor this week. Through a carefully designed experiment, the authors of the paper had found that people make systematic errors in deciding which products they want, depending on how the information is presented to them. Such errors can be exploited by companies who can design their advertisements and other messages using the knowledge of the pattern of errors.

The paper did not, and was not intended to, address two other questions: (1) Is it in the interest of the firms to exploit this knowledge; and (2) If the answer to the first question is yes, should they do so?

To address the first question, one can choose a variety of perspectives on what we mean by "interest of the firm." A broad perspective that includes various stakeholders (e.g., shareholders, employees, as well as customers) would suggest that selling an extra toaster to customers who, in absence of manipulation of information presented to them, would not have bought one, is likely to be a wealth transfer from customers to shareholders, employees and other suppliers of factors of production in its first order of magnitude. In the second order of magnitude, there could be negative (e.g., unused appliances gathering dust in the attic) or positive (e.g., higher direct or indirect employment) effects. Under this perspective, desirability of using the errors of cognition in marketing becomes a complex problem of macroeconomic social welfare analysis.

Under a narrower "maximizing the shareholder value "perspective on "interest of the firm," the firm may be able to increase its profits by manipulating the manner in which it presents information to its potential customers. However, there is considerable literature in management and marketing to suggest that such gains from taking advantage of customer errors are likely to be short-lived, and in the longer run, may well redound to hurt the profitability of the firm. Such tactics and manipulation may divert the attention of the management from products that it genuinely believes best serve the interests of its customers. Moreover, to the extent, the manipulative tactics become known over time, customers may no longer trust the firm, and even turn hostile.

The second question "should the firm choose its actions to exploit any tendencies of its customers to err if it serves its interest, however defined "is more difficult to address. It involves the nature of social contract between firm and society. Taking advantage of others' errors is not illegal, and probably cannot be made illegal without serious problems of definition and enforcement. Should the corporation feel free to engage in an activity if it is not illegal? If the answer is yes, are we willing to live with the consequences? If the answer is no, how do we define and enforce the boundaries of such behavior? Is this something we leave for social mores and norms?

A related question concerns management scholarship. As social scientists, to what extent should scholars think about how their findings might be used in the world of business? Can we foresee their use and consequences of this research? We take credit for our work "new, interesting, important. Are we also responsible for it?

A few years ago when a colleague and I introduced at the School of Management a course on financial fraud, we struggled with the problem of teaching the variety, risks, investigation, and mitigation of fraud without also teaching how to commit fraud and minimizing the risk of getting caught. I wonder if investigation and instruction on human susceptibility to errors of cognition may also present some of the same dilemma for management faculty.

Finally, what is the role of management school in business and society? Are our research and teaching value-free, or do they convey "explicitly or implicitly "dominance of some values over others, and relationships among private and public good. Can and should we link our values to our curriculum and research programs? If so, how?

Look for Winners or Accept the Returns on Market Index

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All the serious money is indexed," Burton G. Malkiel, Princeton economics professor and former dean of Yale SOM, is quoted to have said in Paul Sullivan's February 6, 2010, article in the New York Times. Malkiel's new book, The Elements of Investing, authored with Charles D. Ellis (an active member of the Yale SOM Board of Advisors, as well as a former member of the SOM faculty and the Yale Corporation), suggests that all investors, wealthy included, could do better by investing in index funds. Most people pay dearly for investment advice which is not worth the cost; they are right, of course.

But let us also consider a hypothetical world in which this sage advice was widely accepted and all money was invested in index funds. Index funds economize by saving the high costs of evaluating the individual securities as investment prospects. They act as price takers for the market as a whole, as well as for any individual security transactions needed for rebalancing. This means that index funds transact at prevailing market prices, instead of submitting their own limit orders. How are the market prices to be determined when all traders are price takers?

To the extent market prices of securities closely approximate their underlying but unobserved fundamental values " the well known efficient markets hypothesis " one can indeed save money by skipping the effort involved in finding mispriced securities and resorting to index investing. But if everyone believed in market efficiency, and resorted to this option, there would be no information in the market, and the market cannot be efficient. Market efficiency requires at least some people to believe that it is not efficient, and continue their search for mispriced securities. This is known as the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox.

Fortunately, naturally present noise in markets allows a degree of market efficiency to coexist with the costly search for mispriced securities. "Information people" who spend their time and money on such search are able, on average, to earn slightly higher gross returns at the expense of those who invest without information (e.g., index funds). Only a part of the information produced by the former leaks out to the uninformed investors through market prices, allowing the informed to earn a return on their efforts. However, after the cost of the effort is subtracted, their net returns (on average) are comparable to the returns of the uninformed. Researchshows that on the margin, it does not matter on average whether you choose to look for mispriced securities or invest in index funds.

What is true on average is not true of every individual. Some may have superior capability to identify underpriced securities. However, of the thousands of people who would like investors to believe in and pay for their investing acumen, the record shows that only a small fraction might have valid claims. When one hires an investment manager, it is not easy to distinguish real talent, as opposed to pretense of talent. Even long records of beating the market may be little more than a lucky run of coin tosses " less likely but possible.

Perhaps Malkiel and Ellis have the right advice " stop looking for superior returns, invest in the market index, and passively accept whatever happens to the market as a whole. However, let us hope that not everyone would accept the advice; otherwise the assumptions on which that advice is based will longer be valid. As more money free rides on market information through being invested in the market index, prices become noisier and therefore less efficient, shifting the balance away from index investing. Thanks to this property of how markets function, the volumes of informed and indexed investments tend to retain a mutual balance in which both groups can still earn comparable net returns on average.

Shyam Sunderthe James L. Frank Professor of Accounting, Economics, and Finance at Yale SOM teaches Securities Valuation (MGT 948) in the fall (with Prof. Matthew Spiegel). Teams of two students analyze, report, present, and defend their investment recommendations to convince the class acting as the investment committee of a fund looking for superior returns. Visit the< a href="http://analystreports.som.yale.edu/">course website for selected investment reports from the past offerings of the course.